


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COMBAT CRITICAL TASKS FOR AN AIDE-DE-CAMP

A Monograph
by

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Armor



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ABSTRACT

COMBAT CRITICAL TASKS FOR AN AIDE-DE-CAMP by Major
Philip R. Tilly, USA, 70 pages.

The purpose of this monograph was to determine what tasks are critical for an aide-de-camp to perform during combat operations.

Three areas provided data for this research: historical documentation, doctrinal and regulatory guidance, and contemporary input.

The contemporary input was gathered through a questionnaire distributed to officers who served as aides during combat operations. The questionnaire queried officers having served in that capacity since 1989.

The study found five broad functional areas under which combat critical tasks could be organized: (1) provide the general communications support, (2) expedite information flow to the general, (3) provide responsive transportation support to the general, (4) provide security/personal safety for the general, and (5) provide for the general's personal support requirements.

The combat critical tasks are too numerous to fit within this abstract. They are listed in the conclusions section. The study also collected numerous tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for aide duties in combat.

The significance of this study is in addressing a lack of written material available for an aide specifically dealing with combat duties.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
APPROVAL PAGE	ii
ABSTRACT	iii
 SECTIONS	
I. INTRODUCTION	1
II. RESEARCH METHODOLOGIES	5
III. HISTORICAL FINDINGS	6
IV. DOCTRINAL AND REGULATORY RESPONSIBILITIES	16
V. CONTEMPORARY INPUT	27
VI. CONCLUSIONS	31
ENDNOTES	41
 APPENDIX	
A. QUESTIONNAIRE	47
B. QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS	53
C. QUESTIONNAIRE COMMENTS	56
D. QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONDENTS	68
BIBLIOGRAPHY	70

Section I: Introduction

The topic for this study arose after having expending considerable effort in trying to serve adequately as an aide prior to and during combat. I concluded that such a task was difficult at best, and almost impossible at worst. The high degree of frustration that I and others experienced serving as aides in Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm could have been greatly reduced had a document existed that would have addressed combat critical tasks for that position. Combat generates many unique situational requirements that are difficult to anticipate, let alone for which to prepare.

This study seeks to capture those tasks that are critical for an aide during combat operations. It is important to recognize that combat differs from one situation to the next, and therefore combat critical tasks may vary also. Additionally, no two generals are the same, just as no two aides are the same. Though combat operations for an airborne unit may contrast greatly in comparison with a mechanized force, there are still similarities to be found. The intent behind this work is to identify those combat critical tasks, to organize them

under functional headings, and to produce a working guide to assist future aides in supporting their general.

Airland Operations doctrine provides guidance for units conducting combat operations. The development and subsequent use of Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) manuals within the Army community has greatly assisted the force in translating doctrinal guidelines into tactical mission standards. These TTP manuals devote considerable attention to the commander and his staff in providing direction for tactical operations. It is around the commander that the command and control battlefield operating system revolves. The commander's staff helps him in planning, preparing for, and executing operations. A key individual within his personal staff (at division and higher) is the commander's aide-de-camp.

The idea behind the TTP manuals is to provide a "how-to" guide for conducting operations within doctrinal parameters. The TTP manuals describe various methods for executing staff responsibilities, and also describe how units may execute a given mission. One member of the commander's personal staff who receives little to no mention within current TTP manuals is the commander's aide. Although he is doctrinally charged with many responsibilities to support his commanding general,¹ he receives limited doctrinal guidance and no TTP direction

for successfully executing his duties. How then can an aide-de-camp properly prepare himself for duty?

While there are some pamphlets that address numerous duties for an aide,² there are no doctrinal manuals that specifically address combat operations for this staff member. The current literature focusing on aide responsibilities deals almost exclusively with garrison activities. While many of these duties are applicable to combat situations and also to garrison, many are unique to only combat scenarios. Immediate reaction drills to incoming artillery would be an example of a combat-unique task. Tasks that would apply to both include coordinating for transportation and supervising the enlisted aide.

The problem that arises from this situation, especially if an aide is just coming on board and time is limited before combat, is that currently no "how-to" guide exists to help a new aide prepare himself for combat.

Field Manual (FM) 101-5, Command and Control for Commanders and Staff(Final Draft), states that a system is "an organized assembly of resources used to accomplish a set of specific functions."³ In this instance, the command and control system's function is to support the commander in accomplishing his mission. The commander's aide is an essential part of that system. Often it is the aide who is the go-between for the commander and his staff and to internal subordinate units. The aide is in the unique

position to operate with one foot supporting the commander's "command efforts" while the other facilitates effective control procedures through the staff.

The aide has no command authority, but he often helps his commander by transmitting or voicing the commander's directives. This is especially true in combat when the aide is communicating for the commander on one net while the general operates on another. It must be stressed that the aide in combat, just as in garrison, does not wear his commander's rank. He is an assistant, not a substitute.

In the field of control, the aide helps his commander by assisting in monitoring the status of resources and compliance with the general's intent. The aide must work effectively within the staff organization to efficiently express the commander's desires. The ability to effectively express the commander's wants, without appearing to be the source of origin, is an essential quality the aide must master. There is much that an aide must master to support his general. Part of deciding what must be mastered begins with defining "combat critical tasks."

For the purposes of this study, a combat critical for an aide is defined as: Any task that is so critical that omission of such task would result in adverse or dire consequences for the general in question, and possibly for the unit the general is commanding. Successful completion

of such task is absolutely necessary for the general to properly carry out his duties. The important aspect of this definition is that it reinforces the aide's responsibility and relationship to his general. Although this definition refers to a commanding general, the tasks would also apply to any general officer in combat authorized an aide.

Three areas were examined in seeking to answer the research question. These areas were: (1) Historical documentation, (2) doctrinal and regulatory guidelines, and (3) contemporary input. A number of research methodologies supported examination of these three areas.

Section II: Research Methodologies

The fact-finding⁴ method of research seeks to establish what has historically proven to be consistently required combat critical tasks for aides. Given the scarcity of readily available material addressing this topic, the critical interpretation method⁵ is also used in analyzing historical data.

Both of these methods apply in researching doctrinal information. The limited doctrinal evidence is available in Field Manuals, training publications, and Army Regulations (AR). Local publications also assisted here.

Given the very restricted amount of information specifically addressing aide duties during combat, the

survey method⁶ was chosen to fill this vacuum. In this instance, officers who have served as aides during combat since 1989 were queried about their ideas and opinions regarding the research topic. Here, the study seeks to "obtain data from other people."⁷ Although this method will focus more on capturing opinions than in gathering facts, it supports the study's intent. This study uses a questionnaire (Appendix A), a form of survey, to gather input.⁸

Section III: Historical Findings

Historically, the role of a commander's staff has been to ease the burden of controlling his armies, to communicate his desires, and to reduce the administrative burdens of command.⁹ Going back as far as Alexander the Great, commanders have augmented their staff with officers serving as aides-de-camp. In these earlier roles, those officers served to ensure compliance with the commander's orders. Additionally, they gathered information about potential battlefields, opposing forces, and enemy commanders.¹⁰

The nineteenth century saw the beginning of the modern staff system. Included in Napoleon's staff were aides and liaison officers. These two groups included general grade as well as junior grade officers. Their duties and attributes included transmitting information and

directives, reconnoitering potential battlefields, and negotiating with defeated enemies. These duties required professional soldiers who were precise in their observations, able to isolate problems, and able to "discriminate between vital and nonvital tactical information."¹¹ Napoleon used these officers to support what Martin Van Creveld termed the "directed telescope."¹²

Napoleon's use of these officers within this capacity facilitated his ability to circumvent the normal command channels to quickly implement his instructions, gather information, and execute short notice missions. This allowed the commander only one additional tier in passing information vertically, rather than having to rely upon its accuracy after having passed through various command levels. It also provided him with a very responsive pool of resources to react to dynamic changes on the battlefield. These officers were usually handpicked and considered tactically proficient and morally courageous.

Within these duties, Napoleon's aides were often directed to take charge of units and execute fast-breaking tactical missions. They enjoyed several advantages by operating near Napoleon. They had the advantage of tracking the battle with him, listening to his directives during the fight, and having a clear understanding of his intent when directed into action. An example is found during the battle of Austerlitz, 2 December 1805.

During a critical point of the battle, an additional French reinforcement was needed to counteract a temporary setback and stabilize a potentially dangerous situation.

The Emperor turned to one of his aides for assistance:

Napoleon thereupon sent forward his senior aide-de-camp, General Rapp, with two squadrons of *chasseurs* of the Guard and one of Mamelukes to give the *coup de grace*. The tired Russians were unable to withstand the impact of this new attack . . .¹³

Napoleon was not the only battlefield commander during this period to use a system of aides to augment his staff. It is interesting that Napoleon's most famous adversary, the Duke of Wellington, used a similar system. Wellington limited himself to six aides, but had developed a very close and personal relationship with his aides. His aides served to make themselves useful by "writing letters, writing messages, issuing invitations, and generally easing his general's burdens."¹⁴ Over time, the role of aides on the battlefield would grow in responsibility and importance in assisting commanders.

During the American Civil War, battlefields found commanding generals on both sides relying on their aides to augment their command structures. In his book, The Gettysburg Campaign, Edwin Coddington describes how aides were often responsible for relaying messages and dispatching orders.¹⁵ During this period of warfare, equestrian skills were an absolute requirement for aides. The ability to ride swiftly to wherever the intended

recipient of information might be, and then be able to find that one individual, were necessary attributes of an aide.

During the American Civil War, an aide often had significant insight into the battle plans of a force. By attending what would now be called operation orders briefings, or OPORDs, with his general, the aide had access to much information. With this information, and his normal position near the general during combat, an aide had the unique opportunity to often watch a battle unfold while still monitoring the "big picture." Aides were constantly transmitting messages and orders back and forth on the battlefield, conversing with commanders, and staying abreast of the latest information as the situation would develop. Additionally, by usually performing his tasks mounted, the aide had an advantage for acquiring information through enhanced mobility.

First Lieutenant Frank Aretas Haskell, of the Sixth Wisconsin Volunteer Infantry Regiment, Iron Brigade, was an aide who applied that awareness into effective combat leadership during the battle of Gettysburg. Lieutenant Haskell served as aide-de-camp to Brigadier General John Gibbon, commander of the Union's 2d Division, II Corps, at Gettysburg.¹⁶

While trying to return a message to General Gibbon on 3 July 1863, Haskell saw Webb's Pennsylvania brigade begin to falter and retreat under heavy Confederate pressure.

Haskell, as the only mounted officer at the scene, drew his saber, moved to the critical point on the battlefield, and checked the withdraw. Giving orders to the men to "halt, face about, and fire," he temporarily halted the route. General Webb quickly took charge and started directing activities. Haskell recognized the gravity of the situation, perceived a strong potential threat to the overall Union defense, and began looking for help to support Webb's forces.¹⁷

Although Haskell was unable to find General Gibbon immediately, he did find Colonel Hall's brigade. Appraising Colonel Hall of Webb's situation, he requested assistance for Webb's forces. With Haskell's assistance, Hall began to reposition his brigade to protect Webb's position.¹⁸ The enemy attack he was opposing was lead by a Confederate general named Pickett.

Haskell performed all the normal duties of an aide, before and during the battle of Gettysburg. He saw to it that his general was kept informed, passed messages, ensured that General Gibbon's horse was available and always ready, found food for the general, and even helped initially place troops into defensive positions. Haskell distinguished himself, however, by his employment of battlefield leadership coupled with situational awareness. Haskell took what he knew about how General Gibbon wanted to fight his division, applied that to a rapidly developing

situation, and made a crucial decision to affect the battle. Haskell's breadth of knowledge of the overall situation within his division allowed him to assist his general, even in his absence, by carrying out his commander's intent.

During World War II, aides continued to serve their commanders on and off the battlefield. One particularly insightful account of aide duties is offered by Captain Harry C. Butcher, United States Naval Reserve (USNR). He served as "Naval Aide" to General Eisenhower from 1942 to 1945. Although a naval officer, Captain Butcher's duties were not Navy-specific. One key point that Captain Butcher highlights is that Eisenhower never specified what he expected Butcher to do as his aide. Eisenhower never felt a "good staff officer needed to have explicit instructions on how to solve a problem."¹⁹

Butcher had numerous duties ranging from coordinating meetings; taking notes; addressing the press in official and unofficial capacities; inspecting living arrangements; and serving as a confidant and sounding board, historian, photographer, letter drafter, information filter, and administrative assistant.²⁰

Significant within these responsibilities was Butcher's role filtering information for Eisenhower. During the early planning stages of Operation Torch, the Allied North African invasion, information flowing to

Eisenhower grew considerably. Butcher helped his commander by reviewing incoming reports and messages and prioritizing them for his review.²¹ In this instance, Butcher served as a trusted member of Eisenhower's staff in whose judgment and opinion Eisenhower depended. Butcher assisted not only in helping the commander organize information, but also in serving as an objective pair of eyes and ears.

Butcher would ask questions of Eisenhower after receiving new planning or operational information. Eisenhower always appeared to have a ready answer. But one has to wonder how often Butcher's questions served as a catalyst in inspiring Eisenhower to consider some aspect or detail that he may have initially overlooked or forgotten. The ability to illuminate these kinds of details runs parallel to Napoleon's aides' ability to discriminate between vital and non-vital information.

Besides the operational assistance Butcher offered, he also had the traditional responsibility of ensuring to Eisenhower's personal well being. This included finding, securing, and setting up living arrangements, and ensuring the commander was properly fed.²² There are many other historical accounts of successful aides executing duties during combat.

Lieutenant George S. Patton, Jr., served as aide to General Pershing during the American Punitive Expedition in Mexico, 1916-1917. Patton recalls this duty in his book,

War As I Knew It. Pershing dispatched Patton at one point to deliver an order to the commander of the 13th Cavalry operating at Saca Grande, a good distance from their location. Such missions were not uncommon then, given the limited communication capabilities and standing reliance on messengers. Patton describes how it took considerable initiative on his part to not only secure transportation for himself, but also in finding the squadron headquarters and adequately voicing Pershing's intent.²³

General Patton describes several responsibilities his aides shouldered during World War II. These involved transportation for the general (both ground and air), living arrangements (while at his headquarters and during visits to other units), and personal security. The duties of an aide often necessitate risk taking. Major Richard N. Jenson's death, one of Patton's aides, illustrates this point. Major Jenson died from an airbomb attack during combat operations in Tunisia 1 April 1943.²⁴

On the other hand, aide duties do occasionally present comical moments to reflect back on and enjoy. Patton describes one where his two aides, Colonel Codman and Captain Stiller, suffered through the cold (and subsequent illnesses) of Bastogne while he enjoyed relatively good health in the warmer front seat of his open air command car.²⁵ Spending up to six hours a day visiting soldiers and units in contact, Patton was constantly on the move.

Although Patton does not directly attribute his terrain navigation to his aides, it is quite probable that Codman and Stiller did just that from the back seat.

One last point about Patton's observations. Near the end of War As I Knew It, he fails to mention an aide as part of a necessary staff organization under a subheading of *Staff Organization*.²⁶ Yet on the very next page he states that the commanding general's aide should answer the general's phone at night. He further states that a written record is necessary of all important conversations.²⁷ While Patton may not have viewed aides as worthy of mention in a headquarters staff structure, he did recognize their necessity and contribution to supporting the commander. The point about aides answering phones and possibly serving as a "scribe" appears later in more current examinations.

During the Korean War, General Matthew B. Ridgway took command of the U.S. Eighth Army after General Walton Walker died in a jeep accident. During his command in Korea General Ridgway was assisted by his aide, now retired Brigadier General Walter F. Winton, Jr. General Winton had previously served in combat under Ridgway in the 82d Airborne Division during World War II.²⁸

General Winton states that "establishment of rapport is the most important element" in developing a good relationship between a general and his aide. He also points out that he was very familiar with Ridgway's combat

leadership methods prior to working for him in Korea and that Ridgway had confidence in him.²⁹

General Winton addressed many of the battlefield requirements he shouldered: (1) monitoring the nets "with an eye to the probable priorities of the general's needs," (2) coordinating with the "signals officer," (3) coordinating for "timely" transportation arrangements, and (4) ensuring the general's security requirements were met.³⁰

In other areas, General Winton recounts how he had to record in longhand a lengthy meeting between "General Ridgway and the President of Korea." The normal flow of administrative paperwork was handled by the staff when at the commander's headquarters, with General Winton and a small "token" staff handling that mission while operating forward. General Ridgway's personal needs on the battlefield were few and required limited support effort.³¹

Just as General Winton was selected by General Ridgway to serve as his aide based on prior service together, so too did Major Jim Ellis serve as aide to General Creighton Abrams in Vietnam. Ellis had served with General Abrams when he commanded the 3rd Armored Division in Germany. Ellis helped transition Abrams to Vietnam.³² Although not a critical task, having a working familiarity with a general's combat leadership style allows an aide to more easily support his battlefield requirements.

In a more recent historical account, aides were acknowledged as "Key Personnel" on general's staffs at division and corps level during Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm. One source listed several key tasks that supported commanders: (1) getting the general where he needed to go; (2) keeping him in communications and monitoring nets; (3) keeping the headquarters posted on "face-to-face" meetings with other commanders; and (4) serving as "a deputy G3 on the move."³³

This last task of serving in the deputy G3's capacity implies many critical activities. These would include tracking the battle and disposition of forces, enemy force disposition and activities, updating the commander's map and situation board(s), and monitoring the communication nets. Monitoring the nets includes not only the internal command net, but also the higher command net, as well as the internal main effort.

Most of the historical data supports the conclusion that aides arrive on the battlefield bringing with them only the experience they have as line officers or limited staff assignments. Where can the new aide look to find guidance for his combat role?

Section IV: Doctrinal and Regulatory Responsibilities

FM 101-5 specifies several tasks for an aide, in addition to recognizing him as a possible member of the

general's command group. The command group would also include whomever the general wanted to accompany him. The command group is considered to be wherever the commanding general is on the battlefield, and is from where the general will fight the battle. The purpose of the command group is to "make and communicate decisions and to provide leadership, direction, guidance, and supervision."³⁴ The command group is later examined in greater detail.

Because of the unique relationship between the general and his aide, it is relevant to this study to recognize that most, if not all, of the tasks the general is responsible for in combat are also the aide's responsibilities to support, either directly or indirectly. The question of what is combat, or when is it considered to be ongoing, came under consideration in reviewing guidance to the aide.

A preliminary conclusion of this study is that combat operations have peaks and valleys in terms of tempo and momentum. "Combat operations" does not necessarily mean that bullets are flying and people are dieing in a nonstop scenario. The important distinction here is that at the aide-level, combat operations begin as soon as the planning process starts for a specific operation.

Lieutenant General John H. Tilelli, Jr., former commander of the 1st Cavalry Division during Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm, referred to combat operations

in a separate study. He saw combat as including mission receipt and analysis, plans development, troop leading procedures, actual contact with the enemy, and post-contact operations.³⁵ Because of the fluid nature of tactical operations, all these activities may fall under the heading of combat operations. This was an important consideration in finalizing the results of this research.

The aide-de-camp is doctrinally charged with the following responsibilities for supporting the general: (1) personal well-being and security; (2) managing schedules; (3) transportation; (4) protocol; (5) monitoring information flow; and (6) supervising other members of the general's personal staff.³⁶ As stated in FM 101-5, Command and Control for Commander's and Staff, these tasks do not appear to focus on combat activities. It is easy to associate these tasks with garrison duties. One has to question what utility protocol support would provide in combat operations. The same could be said of managing schedules. The application of these responsibilities is difficult to associate with combat. Upon closer investigation, however, the implied combat applications become more evident. What do these tasks require of an aide during combat operations?

Personal well-being and security cover areas such as serving as a body guard, avoiding known enemy forces on the battlefield, local security, coordinating personal security

forces, and ensuring the general gets at least minimal sleep each day. It also includes serving as a relief-valve for allowing the general to vent his frustrations when his tensions build up, regardless of whether you deserve the "steam" or not.

Managing schedules is more reactionary than proactive during combat operations. Major considerations include arranging meetings for the general with his subordinate commanders and key staff personnel, and also impromptu meetings with sister-unit commanders and superiors. Scheduled conference calls also require close attention.

Transportation requirements dictate that an aide be thoroughly versed in all modes of transportation options available to his general. These include not only what is organic to his organization but also what the theater can provide. Special considerations include: (1) fixed wing support availability and airfield locations; (2) helicopter fueling sites; (2) landing site grid locations (both primary and alternate); (3) flying restrictions for both day and night; and (4) current road maps of the areas in which you will be traveling. An aide must also become an expert in flight navigation. A portable Global Positioning System (GPS) device can be a lifesaver. Transportation is addressed more thoroughly later in the study.

Protocol may seem to have no place on the battlefield, but during joint and combined operations the ability to

formally and informally interface with other nation's military and government leaders requires a solid understanding of various customs and courtesies. The aide must be proficient in major protocol procedures and issues unique to that particular theater of operations. The Secretary of the General Staff (SGS) and Protocol Officer can help in this area. The aide can also expect to encounter several senior leaders from his military and civilian chains of command.³⁷

Monitoring the information flow requires the aide to be the "deputy G3" for his general. This requires the aide to monitor the progress of the operation to include: enemy contacts and activities, friendly force disposition and status, logistical show-stoppers, and any changes from higher headquarters. It also means the aide must be aware of voice and hard-copy information going to his general.

The aide must actively attend, even as a nonparticipant, key meetings and discussions that the general conducts. This is very important with subordinate commanders. The general may rely upon his aide to record/remember key points. He may also rely upon his aide to serve as an extra pair of eyes and provide him with unbiased feedback. An aide operating in the dark while trying to support his general is ineffective. If the aide is unaware of battlefield or planning developments he cannot anticipate his general's needs.

Another part of ensuring information flow concerns the general's command group. The aide will often be responsible for organizing the general's command group facility, (i.e., vehicles, radios, maps, SOPs, battle drills, and manning and equipping). The aide must have a clear appreciation of how the general wants to fight in order to structure his command group. The aide must be aware of what critical information requirements the general has established and ensure the command group can monitor such information. The aide will often help information flow by serving as a "scribe."

The scribe function has the aide back-briefing important people within the chain of command and staff on key decisions the general is making. If the general is meeting with his division commanders, the aide helps information flow by transmitting key information developing from the meeting back to the Chief of Staff. In this way the Chief is kept informed of significant developments and new orders.

The aide must always be prepared to take notes, pass messages, and manage information. Having a system for recording grid locations, frequencies, and telephone numbers is crucial in keeping the general informed and in touch with his forces. There is nothing worse than being directed to fly the general to "Colonel Smith's" tactical

command post (TAC CP) during a critical moment of the battle and not having that colonel's TAC CP location.

Supervising the rest of the personal staff demands that the aide have a plan for all aspects of the general's personal requirements. In this regard, the aide must ensure that the drivers have properly prepared the vehicles, that the maps are posted, that the pilots are informed about fuel sites, that everyone who needs one has a map with the necessary graphics, and that the general's personal equipment and uniforms are ready.

The significance of the original doctrinal tasks in light of the unique support relationship between a general and his aide implies that the aide's responsibilities are actually much broader than first portrayed in FM 101-5. At division-level, the commander must "see the battlefield, concentrate forces, direct the battle, and maximize weapon capability," during combat.³⁸ His aide must support these activities. Two of the specified doctrinal tasks, specifically transportation and information flow, clearly apply, so do the implied tasks of robust, mobile communications and protected mobility. The subsequent section on "Contemporary Observations" will further investigate and address these battlefield requirements. Aides receive guidance from other areas.

Very early in his duties a new aide often receives a copy of the "Aide-de-Camp Handbook," either from the

outgoing aide or the SGS. This document is prepared and distributed by the General Officer Management Office (GOMO).³⁹ The handbook is not doctrine, but does relate several smart ideas in fulfilling aide duties. This is an excellent tool for transitioning a new aide into that position. This document does not, however, concentrate on combat-unique responsibilities.

Annex D within the handbook devotes a little more than one page to "Aide Duties in the Field."⁴⁰ Although this annex is short, it does identify several areas an aide must consider for field operations during training and combat. The annex briefly addresses situation maps, communications, pilot coordination, necessary equipment, and maintenance support requirements.⁴¹

Many Army Regulations (AR) also apply to aide responsibilities. For instance, many general officers are authorized an enlisted aide. The GOMO manages the authorizations for enlisted aides. The general's senior aide, the officer aide, will rate the enlisted aide. Customarily enlisted aides are only assigned to Generals, Lieutenant Generals, and certain Major Generals. Army Regulation 614-200 describes what duties an enlisted aide may perform.⁴²

During combat operations, the enlisted aide may support the commander by maintaining his personal equipment, such as uniforms, boots, and operating the

general's mess. The enlisted aide may also maintain the general's living quarters, whatever that arrangement may be. These activities are extensions of enlisted aide duties typically performed in garrison.

Enlisted aides are normally in the Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 94B, or food service specialty. They typically run the general's mess during deployments. The general will eat the same food as the other soldiers within his command. It is the senior aide's responsibility to actively monitor the general's mess activities, ensuring the enlisted aide is aware of any schedule changes, preferences for meals, and unexpected guests that may accompany the general. Additionally, the senior aide may have to help the enlisted aide in acquiring necessary support from the Headquarters Company mess section (from whom the enlisted aide will depend for logistical purposes).

Army Regulation 725-1 addresses some of the special equipment a general officer (GO) is authorized. Items include the general's flag and staff, flag cases, and a GO belt and buckle. The aide should have a backup for lost or damaged items. He should have one GO belt and buckle in "excellent" condition for formal occasions and a "very good" set for normal use. The aide should coordinate with the SGS for movement and posting of the general's flag, and the unit's colors, at the forward deployed headquarters.

The general's pistol is an item of special attention for an aide. The aide normally cleans and maintains this weapon, in addition to his own. An aide must ensure the general always has sufficient ammunition and that the pistol's serial number is recorded. The general should have the opportunity to fire his weapon before deployment, if possible. The aide should be an expert marksman with whatever weapon he may deploy. Although the belt holster works well with the GO belt, it may not be practical during combat. The general's preference of a shoulder or belt holster should be sought.

The general's nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) equipment will also require attention, the key piece of equipment being his protective mask. The aide must ensure that the general has properly fitted and currently prescribed inserts for his mask (if required). If the general will be operating out of a track, in addition to an aircraft, then he will need an M-25 and M-17 series protective masks. The track commander can sign for the track-mounted mask and be responsible for its placement and operation. Ensure the microphone in the M-25 mask is operational while hooked up in the Combat Vehicle Crewman's (CVC) helmet that the general will use. The aide should ensure the CVC is fitted properly.

One other key piece of equipment is the general's helicopter flight helmet. This should be fitted during the

general's inprocessing and maintained on his dedicated aircraft. If the general anticipates ever having to ride in another general's aircraft, or any other helicopter for that matter, the aide should ask the general if he wants his helmet moved to the other aircraft. If his aircraft goes down and he has to hastily board another aircraft, do not forget the general's flight helmet.

Besides the handbook and regulations, the new aide may enjoy some overlap time with his predecessor. This is an especially important opportunity to exploit. A priority during a lull of combat operations should be on "battle handover" between the two aides. This should include the following: (1) inventory and inspection of the general's equipment; (2) review of transportation and communication support arrangements and operations; (3) maps; (4) Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for battle drills (what to do if the general gets wounded, what if the aircraft is shot down, etc.); (5) getting to know the staff, both the CG's (to include drivers, pilots, enlisted aide, personal security, and secretary if possible) and the unit's; (6) navigation techniques while mounted or airborne; and (7) any personality considerations unique to the general.

The last resource to consider as a new aide is the other aides serving in the same operation or campaign. They can help by sharing information, such as unit dispositions and activities, telephone numbers, frequencies

and call signs, helicopter landing and fuel site locations, operational developments, and any tactics, techniques and procedures that are proving effective for them. Also, the SGS of sister units and the next higher headquarters can be crucial players in providing assistance and information. Anytime an aide visits another unit, he should make it a point to get to know these individuals and their staffs.

Section V: Contemporary Input

To ensure contemporary input to the study, several officers who recently served as combat aides were contacted through a questionnaire (Annex A) on their assessment of combat critical tasks. The intent of the questionnaire was to describe and validate certain functional areas and supporting critical tasks, in light of historically proven and doctrinally directed responsibilities. It also sought to gather unstructured responses by allowing room for general comments, generated from probing questions. Those responding provided feedback through "Yes/No" answers (Annex B) and with written observations (Annex C). Annex D lists those officers contacted during the study.

Annex B illustrates that the questionnaire achieved some success in anticipating common responses to the inquiries. The respondents' answers support the preliminary assessment that some historical trends and certain doctrinal requirements do apply in contemporary

combat scenarios for an aide. The initial research for this study proved relevant in the final structuring of the questionnaire.

Specific areas addressed from the questionnaire responses include: (1) General's guidance; (2) communications; (3) transportation; (4) security; (5) personal support; (6) information flow; and (7) aide prioritization of effort. A brief description of the responses from each area follows.

Generals' guidance to their aides varied as much as the generals' leadership styles. Although some officers received specific guidance addressing what this study defines as combat critical tasks, it was seldom called that. While this guidance was sometimes stated at the beginning of the working relationship, it often developed over time as situations warranted. A common point apparently emphasized to several officers was the importance of communications.⁴³

Based on responses, general officers consistently stressed to their aides a need for dependable and robust communications capability during combat operations. The implied task being to provide redundant communications capability. Although the aide may not have been the dedicated radio/telephone operator (RTO), he was responsible for ensuring his general had communications.

Additionally, this necessity often required aides to be communication system experts.⁴⁴

The area of transportation was recognized as a combat critical functional area. Although the questionnaire did not graduate this function into specific modes of transportation, it did substantiate the ability to move the general on the battlefield as a combat critical task. This often meant aerial mobility as well as ground mobility, while still maintaining solid communications support.⁴⁵

The area of personal security for the general proved to also be a combat critical task for the majority of the officers. Many cited examples of security details also supporting this requirement, or enjoying relative safety while co-located with combat forces. This task is best executed by maintaining an acute situational awareness of potential threats to the general and preparing for them. It often involves calling ahead to the next proposed unit location and requesting an enemy update before moving out.⁴⁶

The responses to questions addressing personal support; such as providing living and sleeping accommodations, food, and personal equipment maintenance; received mixed feedback. Several officers indicated that ensuring the general was fed was a critical task, while the other two areas mentioned received few positive replies.⁴⁷

Generals enjoy the opportunity to eat with their soldiers whenever possible. But an aide must be mindful

that a routine eating arrangement may also support the general's time management plan. If he has a habit of usually eating one meal a day with his Chief of Staff, for instance, this may allow him dedicated time to discuss key issues. Depending upon the situation, the general may still expect to continue this routine even during combat. Additionally, the aide must know what the general likes for quick snacks and what he likes to drink (i.e., Gatorade, water, coffee, or Koolaid).

The questionnaire also looked at information flow. The majority of officers cited this as a combat critical task. Although several officers referenced staff procedures and system hardware as also supporting this need, they did feel the aide was absolutely critical in ensuring the information flowed efficiently to the general. A few officers also pointed out that the aide greatly assisted information flow not only to the general, but also away from the general. These officers underscored the large amount of messages and directives they passed for their generals, not only to subordinates, but also to internal and higher headquarters. These same officers pointed out that the aide must be an information sponge so that the general does not have to be.⁴⁸

Several officers, particularly those serving as corps commander's aides, highlighted the importance of prioritizing their efforts in anticipation of the general's

next requirement(s). This applies not only to the next radio call to make, but also the next critical place on the battlefield the general must visit. This is a product of accurate battle tracking and information flow monitoring.

In order for the general to receive a face-to-face assessment from the division commander on enemy contact that may have just developed, the aide must not only monitor this activity, but must also know where that division commander is located and how to best get there quickly and safely. He needs all this information before the aircraft blades start turning.

The aide's priority effort is to always help the general by anticipating his next critical action, and being prepared to assist him in executing that act.

Section VI: Conclusions

Based on the examination of historical data, doctrinal guidance, and contemporary input, the following areas are assessed as the critical functional areas in which an aide must be proficient. The specific combat critical tasks are listed under each area:

1. Provide the general communications support.
 - a. Be an expert on operating all communications equipment the general may use.
 - b. Maintain the means to allow the general secure communications at any time.

c. Know how to immediately put the general in communications with subordinates, staff, and higher headquarters.

2. Expedite information flow to the general.

a. Monitor significant planning developments.

b. Track significant battlefield activities and developments.

c. Maintain a system for recording information/messages that constitute the commander's critical information requirements (CCIR).⁴⁹

d. Filter unnecessary information.

e. Serve as a "scribe" for the general by recording crucial information from meetings and conversations, passing that information on to necessary personnel.

3. Provide the general responsive transportation support.

a. Ensure his combat vehicle(s) is/are ready for operations. (Always have a backup).

b. Maintain communications with drivers, crews, and pilots at all times.

c. Be an expert at land and aerial navigation.

d. Ensure all modes of transportation have responsive communications and self-defense capabilities.

4. Provide security/personal safety for the general.

a. Maintain situational awareness.

b. Ensure security personnel are proficient with assigned weapons and that all weapons are operational.

c. Have an evacuation plan for any situation and rehearse it.

5. Provide for the general's personal support requirements.

a. Ensure the general gets ample daily rest.

b. Ensure the general eats and drinks adequately.

c. Monitor the general's health status and take preventive measures when necessary.

It could be argued that other areas and tasks might exist. The intent of this study, however, was to look at those functional areas and critical tasks that apply in a broad sense to combat operations unique to forces within the United States Army. It was not the intent of this study to look at only those things characteristically found within an airborne organization or a mechanized unit. Consequently, the functional areas and tasks display a certain generic quality. Despite this seemingly broad application, the similar theme of combat-unique traits is present.

Another product from this research is a comprehensive collection of tactics, techniques, and procedures that apply to aide combat activities. The following represents significant findings in those areas mentioned above.

Communications: An aide must have the current SOI (Signal Operations Instructions); a KY-13 encryption device with his unit's "fill," and also higher headquarters and adjacent units. He should have the proper frequency hopping plan and properly synchronized radios if using SINCGARS (Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System). He also needs a standardized call sign board/sheet; a listing of critical telephone numbers, including MSE, SATCOM, and commercial (as well as ensuring they are properly encrypted); and extra hand mikes. He must be an expert at operating the command console in the general's helicopter. Hand-held walkie-talkies help the aide in local communications with drivers, pilots, and security forces. They also support airborne insertions to aid in linking up with the general once on the ground. A host-nation/English language dictionary, notebook and pen can also help. An aircraft recognition panel marker inside the helmet may come in handy. A strobe light with which to direct aircraft for linkup and evacuations should also be part of an aide's standard equipment.

The following may help an aide operationally support his general. The aide needs to have sufficient acetate, alcohol markers, templates, Scotch tape, heavy wrapping tape, map cases, erasers and alcohol for overlay reproduction (each vehicle the general travels in needs a map and overlay posted). Teach drivers, crew chiefs and

security personnel how to reproduce overlays (insist on a straight edge for witness marks on overlays - very important when transcribing overlays from 1:250,000 to 1:50,000 scale). The general's operations map overlay should be updated with each visit to the Operations Center. Develop a system to track enemy and friendly force's battle status, (mirror the system used by G2/G3). The aide should have a system for arranging and posting maps; in the desert this is especially critical given the number of maps an operation requires. A system of attaching the maps to small, individual plywood boards with VELCRO backing works well. Place the reciprocal VELCRO tape on a master board and number the individual map boards. As the operator leaves one map sheet, he detaches the plywood board and emplaces the next numbered map board. This system works in armored personnel carriers and in UH-60 Blackhawks. Lastly, know the unit's tactical SOP (TACSOP).

In the realm of transportation support, the aide must ensure drivers, aircraft crews, and security personnel are acceptable to the general. Additionally, they must understand the general's priorities, operational limitations, and "ground rules" imposed upon them for support. They must be proficient in using the GPS, LORAN (navigation device), and basic navigation. These same personnel must be superior in radio/telephone procedures.

Before ever moving out to a new location on the battlefield, call whoever owns that particular piece of real estate and check on the enemy situation. Inform that commander that the general is heading into his area of operations and by what mode of transportation he will arrive. The general's headquarters should constantly receive updates on the his location and activities from the aide during combat.

The aide must monitor the general's aircraft scheduled maintenance so as not to allow scheduled services (PHASES) to interfere with flight support. He should have easy access to a backup aircraft in the event the general's aircraft goes down, either because of maintenance or enemy fire, and rehearse exercising this plan. Aircraft fuel site locations and displacement schedules must be tracked. Pilots do not always have access to this kind of information.

If the general has a dedicated combat vehicle for ground transportation, the aide should have a second vehicle operating with it as a team, with systems that mirror exactly what the general has in the original vehicle. The aide must ensure that crew chiefs are qualified with door guns. It is also a good idea to have the drivers and security personnel trained to operate those same weapons. The aide should have a set of battle drills for the routine and the unexpected, (e.g., local security

while the aircraft is on the ground, driver posting as an air guard, enemy contact procedures, dealing with enemy soldiers who want to surrender, etc.). The driver should maintain enough night vision goggles for all who will need them, primarily the general, driver, aide, and possibly the body guard. The aide and driver should both have extra AA batteries on hand.

On the topic of personnel security and safety, some generals will not operate with dedicated security forces while others recognize the occasional necessity. The aide must be the first step in the interview process for selecting personal security soldiers. Only the names of those soldiers personally felt "right for the job" should be forwarded for consideration by the general. References need to be checked and demand the best.

A MARK-19 (grenade launcher) or M-60 machine gun mounted on the general's wheeled vehicle can greatly enhance local security. The driver and security personnel need the opportunity to re-familiarize and qualify with the selected weapon frequently. Adequate ammunition must always be on hand.

The general's flack-vest should be fitted for wear over his NBC suit. When not being worn, it fits over the vehicle seat back rather well and is easy to grab. The NBC suit and detection tape require constant attention for tears and rips. One extra NBC suit, extra NBC glove

inserts, and tape, should be in the general's vehicle. The general's ruck sack should be packed by the aide and general together so that both know exactly what is there and where it is located. Have extra water on hand.

The walkie-talkie is an excellent communications device for close-in local security requirements. Contact drills and fire discipline must be stressed at all times. The idea should not be to stand and fight local encounters with the general in tow, but to move the general to a place of safety. All necessary personnel should have a walkie-talkie. A recharger should be part of the complete system. The walkie-talkie is an excellent device through which to alert aircraft crews or vehicle drivers of short-notice missions.

The last area to consider is personal support. Most general officers are in excellent physical condition. During lulls in the operation, assist the general in conducting physical training (PT). During runs, ensure the area is secure. Running with the general or having another general work out with the boss helps him establish a good routine. A healthy PT program is also a stress reliever. Additionally, be mindful of any medications the general is taking, and to which medications he may be allergic. Know his blood type.

During actual fighting, the aide must anticipate opportunities for the general to grab some sleep, even if

just a catnap. The floor of his aircraft, the deck of his tank, or a liberated hotel room offer a possible location for a brief rest. Keep a poncho liner handy.

While not a force multiplier, the general's sleeper van does offer him the opportunity to cleanup, put on a clean uniform, and rest in a climatically controlled environment. When considering the effects of combat stress and tension on a general, especially over a long period, these few moments of refreshment more than compensate for the burden of transporting and securing the van/truck. The overriding consideration here is that if any one person within the unit needs sound rest in order to make life and death decisions it is the general.

The general's sleeper van also supports the general's personal staff (aide, driver, security, and sleeper van driver) by transporting their tent (on top of the cab). It can also serve as a conduit for electricity into that tent where many nights are spent making overlays and reviewing plans. The general's sleeper van driver is a key player and should display qualities similar to those of the general's dedicated driver. If this driver is proactive in pursuit of his duties, expect to see him showing up with his own tool box inside the cab. Bring extra rope for clothes lines and clothes pins for the general's laundry needs. Also, the general's water supply in his van must always be topped off.

The last point of personal support is ensuring the general eats and drinks sufficiently to sustain his efforts. The aide should know what the general likes, how to get it and transport it, and make it available to him even when he does not ask for it. The enlisted aide is a major player here.

In conclusion, while many critical tasks identified seem obvious, some are not recognized until execution is required. The doctrinal guidance provided in FM 101-5 proved more applicable than initially thought. Many tasks appeared garrison oriented but did have combat application.

In the area of guidance, an aide should go to his general and ask for his directions in determining what tasks that general feels are most crucial for his support to be effective. Combat scenarios will vary and situational necessities may change. The effective aide will seek to anticipate his general's needs and prepare accordingly. This study was designed to help in that effort.

ENDNOTES

¹Department of the Army, FM 101-5, Command and Control for Commanders and Staff (Final Draft) (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1993), 3-70.

²Department of the Army, "Aide-de-Camp Handbook," General Officer Policies (Washington, D.C.: local reproduction, October 1994).

³FM 101-5, 1-2.

⁴Tyrus Hillway, "The Scholar as Detective: The Search for Clues," in Introduction to Research (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1964), 99 - 101. The fact-finding method of research focuses on searching for facts to provide information pertaining to the problem.

⁵Ibid., 101 - 103. The critical interpretation method of research relies upon logical reasoning to determine solutions. It is applicable when specific facts addressing a problem are lacking. For the historical portion of research compiled for this study, few "facts" specifically addressing the research question are available. Instead, there are numerous observations and recollections that imply importance associated with aide tasks. From these observations one can draw conclusions based on association and reasoning.

⁶Ibid., 187 - 210. The survey method seeks to gather data from numerous sources that can contribute in answering the research question. The survey method, or descriptive study, seeks to gather information about an existing situation. In this instance, the questionnaire attempts to capture recent observations from officers who have served in combat as an aide-de-camp. In this study, a sample was chosen. The actual population would include all aides who

have served in combat. The sample represents a portion of that population and is defined as those officers having served in that position since 1989.

⁷Ibid., 188.

⁸Ibid., 201 - 202.

⁹Martin Van Creveld, Command in War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), 40.

¹⁰LTC Gary B. Griffin, The Directed Telescope: A Traditional Element of Effective Command (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1991), 3 - 4.

¹¹Ibid., 7.

¹²Van Creveld, 75.

¹³David G. Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon (New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, Inc., 1966), 430 - 431.

¹⁴S.P.G. Ward, Wellington's Headquarters: A Study of the Administrative Problems in the Peninsula, 1809 - 1814 (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), 36.

¹⁵Edwin B. Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1979), 268 - 269, 278.

¹⁶Frank Aretas Haskell, The Battle of Gettysburg (Wisconsin: Wisconsin History Commission, 1908), xi.

¹⁷Ibid., 120.

¹⁸Ibid., 124.

¹⁹Harry C. Butcher, USNR, My Three Years With Eisenhower (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1946), xiii - xiv.

²⁰Butcher, My Three Years With Eisenhower.

²¹Ibid., 54.

²²Ibid., 196.

²³George S. Patton, Jr., General, War As I Knew It (Boston,: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1947), 369 - 370.

²⁴Ibid., 50 - 51.

²⁵Ibid., 242.

²⁶ Ibid., 358 - 359.

²⁷Ibid., 360.

²⁸Matthew B. Ridgway, General, The Korean War (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Caompany, Inc., 1967), 98.

²⁹Brigadier General (Retired) Walter F. Winton, Jr., in a letter to the author, 17 October, 1994. In response to this study's questionnaire mailed to him on 8 October 1994. Currently maintained by this author, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Page 1 of 3.

³⁰Ibid., 2 - 3.

³¹Ibid., 3.

³²Lewis Sorley, Thunderbolt (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), 195 - 196.

³³Department of the Army, Commander's Planning Group, Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), TRADOC Pamphlet 525-100-1, Leadership and Command on the Battlefield (Washington, D.C.: 1992), 21.

³⁴Department of the Army, Field Manual 101-5, Command and Control for Commanders and Staff (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1993), 3-1.

³⁵Interview with LTG John H. Tilelli, Jr., Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, US Army. Former Commanding General, 1st Cavalry Division during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Interviewed as part of a separate study by this author in pursuit of a Master of Military Art and Science degree on 24 February 1994, Bell Hall, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Written recording. Text

was referenced from the author's thesis: A Recommendation for the Heavy Division Command Group, page 145.

³⁶Department of the Army, Field Manual 101-5, Command and Control for Commanders and Staff (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1993), 3-70.

³⁷A number of references are available regarding protocol and proper conduct in various situations. The following may offer some assistance: Army Regulation (AR) 600-25, Salutes, Honors and Visits of Courtesy, originally dated 15 May 1970, with nine (9) changes, and two (2) changes to the TRADOC Supplement; Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA Pam) 600-2, The Armed Forces Officer, 1988; DA Pam 600-60, A Guide to Protocol and Etiquette for Official Entertainment, 15 October, 1989; Army Regulation 840-10, Description and Use of Flags, Guidons, Tabards and Automobile Plates, 26 November, 1990; The Officer's Guide, 1993, 46th Edition; and AR 600-50, Standards of Conduct for Department of the Army Personnel, January 28, 1988. The publication dates are current as of this printing.

³⁸Department of the Army, Field Manual 71-100, Division Operations (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1990), 1-22.

³⁹General Officer Management Office, DACS-GOM, Chief of Staff, 200 Army Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20310-0200. Telephone commercial (703) 697-7994/7995/3605 or DSN: 227-same. FAX: (703) 614-4256, DSN: 224-4256. GOMO is located in Room 2E749 of the Pentagon. GOMO assists the Chief of Staff of the Army in managing General Officer administrative and professional requirements, to include maintaining and updating the Army General Officer Roster. It is here that you can request The Aide Handbook or normally any information regarding general officers.

⁴⁰Department of the Army, "Aide-de-Camp Handbook," General Officer Policies, Annex D, 67 - 68.

⁴¹Ibid.

⁴²Department of the Army, Army Regulation 614-200, Change 15, Selection of Enlisted Aides for Training and Assignment (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1990), 66. This

regulation specifies that enlisted aides may "assist with the care, cleanliness, and order of assigned quarters, uniforms, and military personal equipment." If the general's quarters will be mounted on a truck during combat, it is usually the Headquarter's Company Commander (at whatever level) who will provide the driver for that vehicle. This soldier may fall under your supervision immediately before and during combat operations. The enlisted aide needs to assist in preparing for deployments by inspecting the quarters with you to ensure it is adequate for the general. The enlisted aide can also help the driver by orienting him on unique requirements the truck should provide. Items such as bed linens, reading light bulbs, toilet paper, soap, and towels are readily available through supply channels and must be inspected prior to deployment. Having a few extra pairs of uniforms already pressed and hanging in the general's mobile quarters may facilitate packing requirements. Make sure you bring all the necessary uniforms the general may need, to include extra patches; name tags; general stars, to include the next higher rank; lots of Kiwi boot polish, Braso, and backup material for maintenance on the general's General Officer (GO) belt. Do not leave the general's Physical Training (PT) gear behind unless you absolutely can not bring it.

⁴³Because of the condition of anonymity promised to the questionnaire respondents, specific reference to their comments will be made by referring to what number questionnaire survey(s) is cited or by the percentage of respondents responding in like manner. In this instance respondents #2, 3, 8, and 9 emphasized their general's stress on the importance of communications.

⁴⁴Eighty-eight percent (88%) of respondents answered favorably to having to be communications systems experts (question #10).

⁴⁵One hundred percent (100%) of respondents answered favorably to considering mobility/transportation a combat critical task (question #13).

⁴⁶Eighty-eight percent (88%) of respondents answered favorably to considering personal security support for the general a combat critical task (question #23).

⁴⁷Sixty-three percent (63%) of respondents answered favorably to considering feeding the general a combat critical task (question #30). Personal support areas of equipment (question #26) and living accommodations maintenance (question #28) received only thirty-eight (38%) and twenty-five percent (25%) (respectively) favorable response as combat critical tasks.

⁴⁸Eighty-eight percent (88%) of respondents answered favorably to considering ensuring information flow to the general a combat critical task (question #17).

⁴⁹FM 101-5, Command and Control for Commanders and Staff (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1993), 1-8, 3-33, 4-47, 4-48. Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIR) allow the general to "define his information needs which, in turn, focuses the efforts of subordinates in acquiring, processing, and filtering information. The CCIR communicate unknown information that the commander needs and considers critical to determine a specific course of action. Using CCIR ensures that information transmitted to the commander is meaningful and readily recognized as critical to his mental vision of the situation." (6-6). CCIR help the commander control information flow by prioritizing information that he needs and receives. CCIR are determined by the commander and should be posted in the operation centers of his organization. Examples would be, "What is the location and disposition of the enemy's forward detachment? When will the lead elements of our Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) reach Phase Line Sword? When will we consume fifty percent of our organic Class III (fuel)?" When these conditions occur or the information is determined, they are reported immediately to the commander. This streamlines information flow to the general.

APPENDIX A:
QUESTIONNAIRE

Number #1

RECOGNIZING THAT COMBAT CONDITIONS CAN VARY, AND THEREBY AFFECT THE RESPONSES TO SOME OF THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS, PLEASE ANSWER THE QUESTIONS AS THEY WOULD APPLY TO YOUR EXPERIENCES. Please circle the 'Y' for yes and 'N' for no. In those instances where a written response is necessary, please provide your response in the lines immediately below the question. If you do not feel the question is relative to the intent of the study, just write 'N/A' for not applicable.

A combat critical task is defined (for the purposes of this study) as: Any task that is so critical that omission of such task would result in adverse or dire consequences not only for the general in question, but possibly also for the unit the general is commanding. Successful completion of such task is absolutely necessary for the general to properly carry out his duties.

1. While serving as an aide, did your general ever lay out or describe what he envisioned would be your combat critical tasks before or during combat operations?

Y N

2. If you answered 'Y' to the above question, then please elaborate on his guidance and what he said were your critical tasks. If you answered 'N' then please move on to question #3.

3. During your assignment as aide did you ever ask your general for specific guidance on what he wanted you to perform as far as specific duties or tasks were concerned?

Y N

4. If you answered 'Y' to question #3, then please elaborate on what he may have said to you. If you answered 'N' then please move on to question #5.

5. Did you learn what tasks were critical for successful combat operations in supporting your general more from discovery through trial and error than by having them prescribed to you?

Y N

6. Did you try to find any literature, or seek out a personal source, for information on combat critical tasks before executing your duties as an aide?

Y N

7. If you answered 'Y' to question #6, were you successful?

Y N

For the sake of simplicity, I have divided critical aide tasks into the following three functional areas: operational support, survivability support, and personal support. Your assessment may be completely different. Please provide your responses to the following questions as they would apply to those functional areas. There is room at the end of this questionnaire for further elaboration.

8. Operational. Were you required (implied or specified) to provide your general with continuous communications capability during combat? (This does not necessarily mean that you were responsible for running his radio communications, although you might have been, but rather it means that you were overall responsible for ensuring his communications worked when he personally went forward during combat).

Y N

9. Did you consider this a combat critical task?

Y N

10. Were you required to be a communications systems expert (able to adequately work/operate necessary communications equipment) in order to support your general's requirements?

Y N

11. Did you consider this a combat critical skill?

Y N

12. Operational. Were you responsible for ensuring continuous mobility support for your general during combat?

Y N

13. Did you consider this a combat critical task?

Y N

14. Were you required to operate his mobility equipment (e.g. jeep, HMMWV, APC, TANK, etc.) to support his mobility requirements?

Y N

15. Was this a combat critical skill?

Y N

16. Operational. Were you responsible for ensuring information flow to your general (e.g., hard copy communications, FRAGOs, OPORDs, letters, etc.)?

Y N

17. Was this a combat critical task?

Y N

18. Survivability. Were you required to provide secure (as secure as possible), responsive ground mobility support to your general during combat?

Y N

19. Was this a combat critical task?

Y N

20. Survivability. Were you required to provide secure (as secure as possible), responsive air mobility support to your general during combat?

Y N

21. Was this a combat critical task?

Y N

22. Survivability. Were you responsible for providing for the general's personal safety and protection during combat?

Y N

23. Was this a combat critical task?

Y N

24. If you answered 'Y' to question #20, could you please elaborate on what specific activities this responsibility may have entailed.

25. Personal support. Were you (either personally or through an enlisted aide, and this applies to the following questions as well) required to maintain the general's personal equipment?

Y N

26. Was this a combat critical task?

Y N

27. Did you maintain the general's personal living accommodations?

Y N

28. Was this a combat critical task?

Y N

29. Were you responsible for ensuring the general was fed properly?

Y N

30. Was this a combat critical task?

Y	N
----------	----------

31. Please describe any additional tasks or functions that you consider critical for an aide to successfully execute during combat. The more specific the detail the better and please do not feel bound by the preceding format or questions.

[illegible]

[Two additional pages of blank lines followed this page in the questionnaire.]

APPENDIX B:
QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS

RESPONDENTS 1-11												
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	TOTAL
	*											YES NO
QUEST #												
1		N	Y	N	N			Y	N	N		2 5
2			*					*				
3		Y	Y	N	N	Y		Y	N	N		4 4
4		*	*		*	*		*				
5		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		N	Y	N		6 2
6		N	Y	Y	N	N		N	Y	N		3 5
7			N	Y	N				N			1 3
8		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y		8 0
9		Y	Y	Y	Y	N		Y	Y	Y		7 1
10		Y	Y	Y	Y	N		Y	Y	Y		7 1
11		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y		8 0
12		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y		8 0
13		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y		8 0
14		Y	N	N	N	N		N	N	N		1 7
15		Y	Y	N	N	Y		N	N	Y		4 4
16		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	N		7 1
17		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	N		7 1
18		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		N	Y	Y		7 1
19		Y	Y	Y	Y	N		N	Y	Y		6 2
20		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y		8 0
21		Y	Y	Y	Y	N		Y	Y	Y		7 1

* PROVIDED WRITTEN INPUT

	RESPONDENTS 1-11												
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	TOTAL	
QUEST #												YES	NO
22		Y	Y	Y	N	Y		Y	Y	Y		7	1
23		Y	Y	Y	N	Y		Y	Y	Y		7	1
24		*	*	*	*	*		*	*	*			
25		Y	Y	Y	Y	N		Y	Y	Y		7	1
26		Y	Y	Y	N	N		N	N	N		3	5
27		Y	Y	Y	Y	N		Y	Y	N		6	2
28		Y	Y	N	N	N		N	N	N		2	6
29		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	N		7	1
30		Y	Y	Y	N	Y		Y	N	N		5	3
31		*	*	*	*	*		*	*	*			

* PROVIDED WRITTEN INPUT

APPENDIX C:
QUESTIONNAIRE COMMENTS

1. Several of the study respondents provided comments with their returned questionnaires. The comments are organized under the questions to which they pertain and are not attributed to a source or in any particular sequence.

2. Some of the questions did not generate any comments and are not referenced. While most of the comments were legible, some were not. In these instances the author concluded on what was the most likely choice of words and denoted this by placing the word(s) in brackets. Any notes by the author are also in brackets, but denoted as such.

a. General Comments:

"The most important aspect of being an aide is the chemistry between you and the general."

"As you discovered in your combat aide function, each general/aide relationship is unique, and establishment of rapport is the most important element in that relationship."

"Members of the general's command must be able to regard the aide as honest, friendly, and useful."

b. Questions #1 and #2:

"Yes - Keep the CG in communications with his HQs and know how to reach Div HQs. When out of comms - let him know. Relay and receive orders from higher & pass orders to subordinates. Keep G3 informed of his decisions."

"Yes - Be another set of eyes for him! Know operations, keep him talking (commo), don't get him lost and don't let him be late!"

c. Questions #3 and #4:

"Yes - I only asked for specific guidance on the set-up of his M113A3 command track. Unfortunately, he gave very general guidance. I had to apply past experience to

develop a command vehicle that was survivable, "livable," and could communicate long distances. He was pleased with the end product."

"No - It was more of a trial and error basis. I would perform the tasks I thought more necessary and he would direct me from that point. The G-3 planning cell - several majors (SAMS) - helped me with having OPORDs and overlays on hand. The CG never readily dictated what I had, but always seemed pleasantly surprised when I could produce a document, overlay, etc., that he needed. I tried to stay one step ahead of him!"

"Yes - He wanted someone who would be very candid with him no matter the circumstances, someone he could trust with very sensitive information/discussions; someone who would keep him on schedule and out of the weeds."

"Yes - Keep me in comms! ! ! ! Stay tuned to what's important to him and help in any way possible. Keep a battlefield awareness."

d. Question #6 and #7:

"Yes - Did not have much time prior to deployment (but did seek out others with information)."

"I did not find anyone with personal experience on being an aide in combat. Often times we traded info with other aides in country. As you know, the "aide network" was a great source of info and advice!"

"Yes - Sought out advice from other aides in Europe & our Division G3/G3 Ops."

e. Questions #8 and #9:

"Yes - The most critical."

"Yes - 1. FM comms (ground/air/HF), 2. Regular telephone, 3. Satellite/cellular phone."

f. Questions #10 and #11:

"Yes - Those systems we carried or had access to (TACSAT), (MSE), (FM)."

[Author's note: the above acronyms stand for Tactical Satellite, Multiple Subscriber Equipment, and Frequency Modulation. These were the most frequently used tactical

communications systems during Operations Desert Shield/ Desert Storm.]

"Yes - UH60 Blackhawk equipped w/ the Command & Control console."

"Yes - Most Definitely!"

g. Questions #12 and #13:

"Yes - Tough (working with aviators)."

"Yes - 1. Air (helicopter), 2. Ground - Military & Civilian."

h. Questions #14 and #15:

"No - Had drivers, security pers who did this."

"Driver & pilots were. (This was a combat critical task) for Driver & pilots - not me, although I did occasionally drive."

"No - I trained as loader on his Abrams, however never served in that capacity."

[Author's note: "Abrams" refers to the M1 series tank.]

"No - I did not have to operate his vehicle; however, I maintained a license just in case something happened to the driver. The SLUGGER [GPS] was a most critical piece of equipment which I learned to master! A must for an aide."

[Author's note: This opinion about the GPS was shared by all those officers who operated in the desert during Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm.]

"No - Not for me to operate his transpo, but certainly for me to ensure that helo/vehicle/tank crews were constantly prepared & capable."

"For reconnaissance and long range transportation the Air Force was cooperative in providing appropriate craft. My transportation role was limited to making timely arrangements - not operating any vehicles, which were driven by those skilled in operation."

i. Questions #16 and #17:

"No - G3 was for operational."

j. Questions #18 and #19:

"Yes - Layed on personal security. Recon'd routes."

k. Questions #20 and #21:

"Yes - Had a UH-60 C2 bird dedicated to the General. I personally briefed the pilots on all missions & recc'd routes when possible."

[Author's note: UH-60 is commonly referred to as the "Blackhawk" helicopter, a highly capable aircraft both in terms of survivability and power.]

"Yes - I coordinated all air and ground vehicle support. The pilots worked for the general but reported/coordinated with me."

l. Questions #22 and #23:

"Yes - Personal security assigned. Coordinated w/ local authorities - worked closely w/ CID, MP's, host nation."

[Author's note: CID is the Criminal Investigation Division and MP's are Military Police. "Host nation" refers to the nation in which operations were conducted.]

"Yes - We were never (much) in harms way - however his security was always on my mind."

m. Question #24: (Response after favorably responding to Question #20)

"Nothing special - just taking care of the G.O. in order to allow him to concentrate on the important stuff."

"Since it was virtually impossible & unreasonable to have attack aircraft escort our UH60 everywhere, we simply made do w/ UH60 door gunners. We also carried M-16s aboard the aircraft so, in the event we went down, the helo crew could provide security around the aircraft. Additionally, with the command console in the helo - which gave us the ability to talk to anyone via radio & SATCOM - extra security was only a radio call away."

"My general fought from a M113A3. On numerous occasions he wanted to quickly move to a Bde Cdr's location by air. The CG's pilots monitored both Div Cmd and O/I nets. In this highly mobile fight (Desert Storm), I was successful about 60% of the time in bring his UH60 in when the CG demanded it."

"I kept in communications w/ our UH-1. I leap frogged the aircraft forward as we moved forward during combat. I needed this aircraft able to pick us up within 20 minutes (estimate) in order the CG could rapidly attend a Corps meeting. (This happened during the 3 day assault). I was the key individual in the aircraft who navigated. Our pilots had to concentrate on flying, I navigated. This was a combat critical task and very stressful.

I would suggest that an Aide spend a lot of training in a helicopter Navigating and Communicating simultaneously!

Note: I was awarded an Air Medal for performance in the helicopter and I feel that is the most deserved medal I have been awarded.

I used time, compass headings, and designated knots/hour to navigate.

Once the satellite navigation systems were installed, life was easier. However, navigation is still a very important skill for the Aide."

"All air mobility assets were controlled by the JTF HQ so I had to plan ahead and coordinate w/ the J3 Air office to ensure support. Normally there was an aircraft available during daylight hours but not always. Sometimes I'd have to hustle one up from wherever I could."

"Had a helicopter to move around on the battlefield. CG gave orders face-to-face. Had two back-ups during the war."

"Yes - My general used a UH-1H C2 helicopter which had pilot, copilot and 1 crew chief who also served as the other door gunner. All 8 months in DesertShield/ Storm, the Pilot in command worked with me to

coordinate LZ, PZ, times, and water. I maintained 24 hour communications with both pilots."

n. Questions #25 and #26:

"Only to a small degree - his weapon, field gear."

o. Questions #27 and #28:

"Driver, enlisted aide did this."

"enlisted aide"

p. Questions #29 and #30:

"CG must be kept fed & warm in order to make the decisions (required). Never was told to do this, but considered it my job."

q. Question #31. [This question requested any comments the respondent might want to offer as well as any tasks or functions that he considered critical not covered in the questionnaire]:

"Protocol for high level US and foreign diplomats!
CG mess operations.
Barber.
Be a good note taker.

Duties: (1) Security, (2) Commo, (3) Operations, (4) Daily calendar, (5) Mess, (6) Protocol, (7) Correspondence.

The only reference I found on being an aide in combat (don't remember the name) was something very interesting. It spoke along the historical perspective . . . [This reference is to LTC Griffin's pamphlet used earlier in the study, The Directed Telescope.] It emphasized the importance of the aide knowing and understanding how his general thought and conducted business because the aide often issued orders or spoke for the general. (My general) gave me the booklet to read before we departed to Saudi.

[On the topic of dealing with conflicting directions between the Chief of Staff and his general:] To summarize what (my general) said to me: 'Don't be concerned about the chief, I rate and senior rate you; therefore I want your honest opinion of your observations of what you see . . . not what the staff wants you to see to make me happy. You may have to be my eyes and sometimes what you do or report to me may cause you to get some "heat" from the chief.' In other words, I was another set eyes for my general.

My opinion of an aide is that he must be a jack of all trades, master of none. We were out and about a lot in his helicopter which necessitated me staying tuned into operations (to keep him informed) and ensuring commo worked.

On top of that, he entertained many foreign and US diplomats and US entertainers. We had a great protocol officer; however, I still had to know it because the general would ask me about it.

Another part of commo was satellite phone to the US and other generals in country. I had to know how to make the satellite phone work; as well as the regular telephone in order to contact key general officers around the world. As you know I'm sure, this was a difficult and tedious task but was also very critical.

I never let my general out of sight. Even when he said wait outside, I waited within eyesight. The aides I saw that failed, lost control of their general or lost them completely. As you know, you must be prepared for anything! Or any change."

"How an aide works with the general in combat and even in peace is personality driven. My boss was not a demanding person to work for. He was a gentleman who did not like to be fussed over. That made my job easy. Other aides I saw were virtual "men servants" or slaves. Not me. You have to get in the general's operating cycle & ensure he is taken care of. If he got real busy - I ensured he got chow. - If he was taking a break - I kept all non-emergency calls/interruptions to a minimum.

- You have to work very closely with the G-3 in the Assault Command Post (CP) to ensure you know what is going on & you keep the G3 posted - especially during meeting where only the aide is present. You've got to take notes and stay 1 step ahead of the situation. In the IS or at the HQ (main) you work with the Chief of Staff & other principles and Deputy CG & keep everyone posted.

- Staying in comms was a big thing w/ my boss. I became an expert on MARSAT (Marine Satellite Telephone) operations. I also ensured the SATCOM guys were squared away.

- The aide must ensure comms, trans, chow, security personnel, time, briefings & meetings all stay in coordination & never let the boss get embarrassed or get surprised. Combat was easy - - - garrison & the situation during Desert Shield -- that was the challenge!"

[Author's note: ISB stands for the Intermediate Staging Base.]

"Aides must stay out in front of their Cdr. Must anticipate who he might need to talk to, where he will want to go, & move forward with planning to make these actions happen. In combat, the Cdr cannot wait on the aide.

Must know the location of all subordinate Commanders or at a minimum their CP locations. Goes back to earlier (point) about anticipating Cdr's requirements.

Must stay in touch w/ subordinate aides. They are vital to your link w/ their commander. MUST DEVELOP A RAPPORT WITH ALL. You must work together as a team - all can help each other.

Work comms out prior to any visit. Ensure the Cdr's HQs can get in touch with CG at any time. Develop or demand redundant systems. It is not the staff's responsibility to keep abreast of CG's location, it is the aide's responsibility to keep staff informed."

"Keep the map accurate - - update the TOC map when returning from unit areas.

Keep the ADC/CofS/TOC informed of the intentions and locations.

Ensure he gets rest and food.

Provide feed back on his planning.

Keep him informed - - spend time w/ staff sections and subordinate staffs to maintain a good "pulse."

Having thick skin - - you're going to get your ass chewed for something you did not and could not had anything to do with, but you're the closest person. Don't shy away after that happens. Otherwise both you and the general will be less effective."

"Following is my summary of being an aide in combat, hopefully it helps.

1) I felt woefully unprepared to be an aide going into combat. I did not know what to expect or what my duties would be.

2) I depended very much on the Chief of Staff and G-3 for guidance. I worked as much for the Chief of Staff as the General. By this I mean, it was my responsibility to outbrief the Chief after every trip the General and I took. This includes meetings with the higher (Corps) and lower (BDE's, Div TAC, other Div CG's). Any issues which were discussed, I reported to the Chief.

In order of priority, my missions were:

1). Communications

a. Verbal - report back to Chief on all meetings. Serve as the CG's backup to ensure correct grids, times, etc., are received during his meetings. Often we would compare notes after meetings to ensure correctness.

b. Equipment - ensure all commo systems were 100%!!! Have all call signs, frequencies, etc., on hand. FM radio in tank, HUMMV, helicopter.

2). Tactical Equipment

a. Maps - Ensure map sheets are put together, available.

b. Overlays - have relative overlays on hand. Have a method to view several overlays at once, or quickly interchangeable. Have all pens, pencils, clips, etc., available for use.

c. Vehicles - HUMMV, helicopter, tank was set up for Cmd Opns. Ensure all these are available as quickly as possible.

3). Personal Equipment

a. Supervise CG's enlisted aide and Div HQ's Company maintenance section to ensure CG's tent and sleeping van were properly maintained.

b. Oversee CG's mess (used by entire Cmd Section) (fed about 20 soldiers by CG's enlisted aide (cook)).

c. The SGS helped lot in these areas.

During combat the key tasks were

1) Commo

2) Navigation

3) Map and overlay preparation, updating.

Last item: After the ground offensive I became very involved w/ the Division Awards Section. My CG made it a priority to personally pin on all Bronze Stars, Silver

Stars, DFC, etc (cvt awards) except Bronze Stars. We did this one battalion at a time. Therefore, I had to get very involved scheduling, formatting and ensuring the awards & orders were prepared."

"Personal (a) I brought the CG's sleeper van into combat. It was kept/protected by the DTAC. It provided the general warm water & air from a Honda generator. *The sleeper van kept the general alert - I believe it enhanced decision making.

Operational (b) I kept the staff informed beyond the CG's requested messages. I was the scribe who instinctively passed key information to the G3 Plans, G2, G4, & other key BOS staff. When the general thought out loud or gave an order to a Bde Cdr, I followed it through to those staff officers that needed to know.

Operational (c) I controlled the Division Historian & set up personal interviews w/ the CG. I also kept a personal log on the CG's quotes and actions (unfortunately, my general gave the logbook to the Army Times). I tracked the general's moods & personal concerns. I highlighted key points that needed to be reiterated to cars/staff officers. I debriefed the general nightly.

Personal (d) I kept the general in shape. We set up a track around the DMAIN & ran daily.

Operational (e) Reconnaissance: I used my security detail to recon ground routes to the Bde CP's (if time available).

Operational (f) Land Navigation. I was the CG's navigator. I understood the GPS & could immediately "dead recon" w/ a compass when we lost satellite coverage. I never got the CG lost!

Personal (g) I kept the CG's calendar. Visits from Schwartzkopf, Yeosock, Sec Def, Franks, Addington (author) demanded close attention.

Personal (h) Maintained a good attitude despite countless ass chewings and firings. Kept coming back.

Operational (i) Acted as Primary Staff officer. Visiting the hospital immediately after the war, I acted as the G1 issuing impact purple hearts to wounded soldiers. You talk about emotional - the old man was great. One of the most memorable experiences of my life.

Operational (j) Performing w/ no guidance/information. I reacted during combat. Thank God I played High School football. I pressed the Div CSM, Chief of Staff, SGS, etc., to find out what the general was thinking. Sometimes I was right; most times I was wrong. But I was always there for him.

Survivable (k) He told me to find the CSM on the battlefield. I missed a CBU by 2 feet while driving a HUMMV."

[Author's note: CBU is a Cluster Bomb Unit.]

"Let me just recount the things I did in preparation for deployment to the Gulf that, in retrospect, I believe could be pivotal to success in combat:

(1) Commo/Map/Graphics prep - - commo was top priority, tied in with the G3 ops to insure map/graphics were always accurate and that I had a full understanding of the division's disposition and current/future ops.

(2) Security & Transpo - - important to have this plan in place prior to deployment as it will carry over into combat. I put together security/transpo requirements, got feedback from the G3 (and AVN Bde CDR for aircraft) prior to presenting the plan to the boss.

- - sometimes would have a problem with the boss venturing into places he needn't have been (and probably shouldn't have). Here's where an aide must be respectful but insistent . . . The G3 and Chief of Staff are good allies in keeping the boss reasonable/safe. Bottom line - - be prepared for him to make last minute decisions that may put him at greater than necessary risk and either confront him/change his mind (worked for me about half the time), or be prepared to provide necessary security.

(3) If you know your boss well, it's easy to act as an information filter. I think that - - especially during combat - - an aide must know who and what to censor in order to keep the boss' focus on the proper path. Overzealous staff officers in the DMAIN may want the boss to know something now that isn't really important or hasn't been through the G2/G3 or Chief. More often than not, redirecting this kind of information works best . . . otherwise (as I've seen happen), the boss gets overwhelmed w/ BS. If you have any questions about what the boss wants/needs to know about - - especially during combat - - ask him, the G2/G3 or Chief.

(4) I think a combat critical task in regards to eating is keeping a package of food w/ you & the boss wherever you go. During combat, MRE's & canned goods w/ field stove kept us going.

(5) It pays big dividends to keep track of the ADC's, other CG's and Corps CDR - - you'll be asked to find them at a moments notice when your boss needs them so you might as well know where they are. Again, the aide must be an effective information conduit - - otherwise he will most certainly fail."

APPENDIX D:
QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONDENTS

BG W.F. Winton, Jr.
U.S. Army, Retired
Aide to General Matthew Ridgway, Commander, 8th Army, Korea

Major John Scudder
G3 Planner, 1st Cavalry Division
Aide to MG Paul E. Funk, Commander, 3d Armored Division,
Desert Shield/Desert Storm, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait

Major Rick Gibbs
Battalion S3, 82d Airborne Division
Aide to MG J.H. Binford Peay, Commander, 101st Airborne
Division (AASLT), Desert Shield/Desert Storm

Captain Steve Payne
ROTC Instructor, Department of Military Science, Kansas
State University
Aide to MG Thomas G. Rhame, Commander, 1st Infantry
Division (Mechanized), Desert Shield/Desert Storm

Major Jeff Turhune
Student, Command and General Staff College, Fort
Leavenworth
Aide to MG James H. Johnson, Commander, 82d Airborne
Division, Operation Just Cause, Panama

LTC Toby Martinez
Battle Command Division, Director Combat Developments
Aide to LTG Frederick M. Franks, Jr., Commander, VII Corps,
Desert Shield/Desert Storm

LTC Mike Wood
G3 Exercises, 101st Airborne Division (AASLT)
Aide to LTG Gary E. Luck, Commander, XVIII Airborne Corps,
Desert Shield/Desert Storm

Major Keith Robinson
Graduate Student, University of Maryland
Aide to MG Ronald H. Griffith, Commander, 1st Armored
Division, Desert Shield/Desert Storm

Major Tom Besch
Director, U.S. Army Contracting Office, Long Island,
New York
Aide to MG Carmen Cavezza, Commander, 7th Infantry
Division (Light), Operation Just Cause

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